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Bargaining with Optimism

Author

Listed:
  • Muhamet Yildiz

    (Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139)

Abstract

Excessive optimism is a prominent explanation for bargaining delays. Recent results demonstrate that optimism plays a subtle role in bargaining, and its careful analysis may shed valuable insights into negotiation behavior. This article reviews some of these results, focusing on the following findings. First, when there is a nearby deadline, optimistic players delay the agreement to the last period before the deadline, replicating a broad empirical regularity known as the deadline effect. Second, there cannot be a substantial delay under persistent optimism; i.e., excessive optimism alone cannot explain delays. Third, when optimistic players are expected to learn during the negotiation, they delay the agreement in order to persuade their opponents. The delays in these results can be quite costly, Pareto inefficient, and common knowledge at the beginning of the game.

Suggested Citation

  • Muhamet Yildiz, 2011. "Bargaining with Optimism," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 451-478, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:anr:reveco:v:3:y:2011:p:451-478
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    File URL: http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-economics-061109-080334
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Marco Angrisani & Antonio Guarino & Philippe Jehiel & Toru Kitagawa, 2021. "Information Redundancy Neglect versus Overconfidence: A Social Learning Experiment," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(3), pages 163-197, August.
    2. Li, Shuwen & Houser, Daniel, 2022. "Stochastic bargaining in the lab," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 200(C), pages 687-715.
    3. Banerjee, Anurag N. & Markovich, Sarit & Seccia, Giulio, 2019. "The endgame," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 176-192.
    4. Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian, 2017. "Time Preferences and Bargaining," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 38, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    5. Ortner, Juan, 2013. "Optimism, delay and (in)efficiency in a stochastic model of bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 352-366.
    6. Anurag N. Banerjee & Sarit Markovich & Giulio Seccia, 2016. "The Endgame," Working Papers 1601, Nazarbayev University, Department of Economics.
    7. Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch, 2015. "Time Preferences and Bargaining," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /2015/568, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    8. Merlo, Antonio & Tang, Xun, 2015. "Bargaining with Optimism: A Structural Analysis of Medical Malpractice Litigation," Working Papers 15-005, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    9. Francesco Angelini & Massimiliano Castellani & Lorenzo Zirulia, 2022. "Overconfidence in the art market: a bargaining pricing model with asymmetric disinformation," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 39(3), pages 961-988, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    heterogeneous priors; delay;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations

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