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Can HIPCs Use Hyper-Incentives?

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  • Menzies, Gordon Douglas

Abstract

Hyper-incentive contracts (Menzies 2004) can be used to pursue humanitarian goals (providing a safety net) while allowing creditors to offer innovative repayment friendly contracts to debtors (eliminating a debt overhang). Both the contract of Krugman (1988) and the hyper-incentive contract are illustrated with some calculations based on current Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs). The outcomes for the two contracts are similar, but the twelve countries examined could each benefit by an average amount of $US2002100 million under a hyper-incentive contract

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Review of Applied Economics in its journal Review of Applied Economics.

Volume (Year): 4 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1-2 ()
Pages:

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Handle: RePEc:ags:reapec:50012

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Web page: http://www.lincoln.ac.nz/story11874.html

Related research

Keywords: Debt overhang; Debt forgiveness; Hyper-incentive contract; Farm Management; International Relations/Trade; F34;

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  1. Jonathan Eaton, 1991. "Sovereign Debt: A Primer," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 21, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
  2. Paul R. Krugman, 1989. "Financing vs. Forgiving a Debt Overhang," NBER Working Papers 2486, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Fernandez-Ruiz, Jorge, 1996. "Debt and incentives in a dynamic context," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1-2), pages 139-151, August.
  4. Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Tito Cordella, 2002. "Limits of Conditionality in Poverty Reduction Programs," IMF Working Papers 02/115, International Monetary Fund.
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