Political Economy Of Right-To-Farm
AbstractThis paper investigates the motivations for local right-to-farm protection ordinances by estimating a logit model relating the adoption of these ordinances to various political, economic and demographic factors previously found to affect the likelihood of passage of farmland preservation policies. Results suggest that the probability of adopting right-to-farm policies increases with the size and political clout of the farm public and with incentives to promote right-to-farm. Adoption is not enhanced by environmental concerns, nor by factors known to encourage adoption of farmland preservation policies. These findings raise serious concerns about the long-run viability of protections afforded agriculture in urbanizing areas.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Southern Agricultural Economics Association in its journal Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics.
Volume (Year): 31 (1999)
Issue (Month): 03 (December)
nuisance litigation; open space; political economy; restrictive ordinances; right-to-farm; Political Economy;
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- Schlecht, Stephanie & Albersmeier, Friederike & Spiller, Achim, 2008. "Konflikte bei landwirtschaftlichen Stallbauprojekten: eine empirische Untersuchung zum Bedrohungspotential kritischer Stakeholder," DARE Discussion Papers 0808, Georg-August University of Göttingen, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development (DARE).
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- Adelaja, Adesoji O. & Patel, Amish, 2005. "Political Economy of Medical Foods Reimbursement," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19419, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- Duke, Joshua M. & Malcolm, Scott A., 2003. "Legal risk in agriculture: right-to-farm laws and institutional change," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 75(2-3), pages 295-303.
- Adelaja, Adesoji O. & Gottlieb, Paul D., 2009. "The Political Economy of Downzoning," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 38(2), October.
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