Contract enforcement, capital accumulation, and Argentina's long-run decline
AbstractArgentina has slipped from being among the ten world’s richest countries by the eve of World War I to its current position close to mid-range developing countries. Why did Argentina fall behind? We employ a structural model to investigate the extent to which the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights, as measured by Clague et al.’s “contract intensive money” (CIM), conditioned broad capital accumulation and, subsequently, economic performance in Argentina. Our results suggest that poor contract enforcement played a significant role at the origins of Argentina’s unique experience of long-run decline.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Association Française de Cliométrie (AFC) in its journal Cliometrica, Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History.
Volume (Year): 3 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Contract intensive money; Economic decline; Argentina;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- N16 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Latin America; Caribbean
- N26 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Latin America; Caribbean
- N46 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Latin America; Caribbean
- O43 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
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- Campos, Nauro F. & Karanasos, Menelaos G. & Tan, Bin, 2012. "Two to tangle: Financial development, political instability and economic growth in Argentina," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 290-304.
- Leandro Prados de la Escosura & Joan R. Rosés & Isabel Sanz Villarroya, 2010.
"Stabilization and growth under dictatorship: the experience of Franco's Spain,"
Working Papers in Economic History
wp10-02, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Historia Económica e Instituciones.
- de la Escosura, Leandro Prados & Rosés, Joan R. & Villarroya, Isabel Sanz, 2010. "Stabilization and Growth under Dictatorship: The Experience of Franco's Spain," CEPR Discussion Papers 7731, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Sebastián Fleitas & Andrés Rius & Carolina Román & Henry Willebald, 2013. "Contract enforcement, investment and growth in Uruguay since 1870," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 13-01, Instituto de Economia - IECON.
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