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Contract enforcement, capital accumulation, and Argentina's long-run decline

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Author Info
Leandro Prados de la Escosura () (Historia Economica e Instituciones and Instituto Figuerola, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Calle Madrid, 126, Getafe, 28903 Madrid, Spain.)
Isabel Sanz-Villarroya () (Estructura Economica, Economia Publica e Historia Economica,Universidad de Zaragoza, Gran Via 2, Zaragoza, Spain.)

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Abstract

Argentina has slipped from being among the ten world’s richest countries by the eve of World War I to its current position close to mid-range developing countries. Why did Argentina fall behind? We employ a structural model to investigate the extent to which the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights, as measured by Clague et al.’s “contract intensive money” (CIM), conditioned broad capital accumulation and, subsequently, economic performance in Argentina. Our results suggest that poor contract enforcement played a significant role at the origins of Argentina’s unique experience of long-run decline.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Association Française de Cliométrie (AFC) in its journal Cliometrica, Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History.

Volume (Year): 3 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 1-26
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Handle: RePEc:afc:cliome:v:3:y:2009:i:1:p:1-26

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Web page: http://www.cliometrie.org
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Related research
Keywords: Contract intensive money; Economic decline; Argentina;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
N16 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Growth and Fluctuations - - - Latin America; Caribbean
N26 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Latin America; Caribbean
N46 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, and Regulation - - - Latin America; Caribbean
O43 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-24.

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