Are Differentiated Carbon Taxes Inefficient? A General Equilibrium Analysis
AbstractRevenue-raising environmental policy instruments, such as carbon taxes, tend to be politically controversial. In practice, carbon taxes are often differentiated between polluters, implying unequal marginal abatement costs. Grandfathered tradeable permits seem less controversial; this instrument yields equal marginal abatement costs, but does not raise revenue. We compare a system of differentiated carbon taxes, exemplified by the current Norwegian carbon tax regime, to uniform carbon taxation and grandfathered tradeable emission permits. In this particular case, differentiated taxes are welfare superior to grandfathered permits. Nevertheless, uniform carbon taxes outperform both.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by International Association for Energy Economics in its journal The Energy Journal.
Volume (Year): Volume24 (2003)
Issue (Month): Number 2 ()
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