Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Energy Taxation in a Small, Open Economy: Efficiency Gains under Political Restraints

Contents:

Author Info

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Welfare analyses of energy taxes typically show that systems with uniform rates perform better than differentiated systems, especially if revenue increases can be recycled via cuts in more distortionary taxes. However, in the practical policy debates, the scope for efficiency gains is traded against industrial concerns. A major explanation to the widespread use of exemptions in energy tax systems has to be sought in the fact that energy-dependent industries tend to constitute powerful lobby groups. Presumably, energy-dependent industries of small, open economies will suffer relatively strongly if taxed, and compensating them will be costly. This CGE study of the case of equalising the Norwegian electricity tax shows that compensating the energy-intensive export industries is surprisingly modest. It is explained by the role of the Nordic electricity market, which is still limited enough to respond to national energy tax reforms. Thus, electricity price reductions partly neutralise the direct impact of the tax on profits. We also examine the effects of different compensation schemes and find significant compensation cost reductions when the scheme is designed to release productivity gains.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.ssb.no/a/publikasjoner/pdf/DP/dp387.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Research Department of Statistics Norway in its series Discussion Papers with number 387.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: Aug 2004
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ssb:dispap:387

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: P.O.Box 8131 Dep, N-0033 Oslo, Norway
    Phone: (+47) 21 09 00 00
    Fax: (+47) 21 09 49 73
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.ssb.no/en/
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: Energy taxes; Electricity markets; Competitiveness; Compensation; CGE models;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Parry, Ian & Goulder, Lawrence & Williams III, Roberton, 1997. "When Can Carbon Abatement Policies Increase Welfare? The Fundamental Role of Distorted Factor Markets," Discussion Papers dp-97-18-rev, Resources For the Future.
    2. Aghion, P. & Howitt, P., 1989. "A Model Of Growth Through Creative Destruction," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 8904, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
    3. Carlo Carraro & Gilbert E. Metcalf, 2000. "Behavioral and Distributional Effects of Environmental Policy Introduction," NBER Working Papers 7648, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Lawrence H. Goulder & Ian W. H. Parry & Dallas Burtraw, 1996. "Revenue-Raising vs. Other Approaches to Environmental Protection: The Critical Significance of Pre-Existing Tax Distortions," NBER Working Papers 5641, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Dixit, Avinash K & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1975. "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 64, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    6. Bohringer, Christoph & Rutherford, Thomas F., 1997. "Carbon Taxes with Exemptions in an Open Economy: A General Equilibrium Analysis of the German Tax Initiative," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 189-203, February.
    7. Goulder, Lawrence & Bovenberg, A. Lans, 2000. "Neutralizing the Adverse Industry Impacts of CO2 Abatement Policies: What Does It Cost?," Discussion Papers dp-00-27, Resources For the Future.
    8. Don Fullerton & Gilbert E. Metcalf, 1997. "Environmental Controls, Scarcity Rents, and Pre-Existing Distortions," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 9703, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
    9. S. Baranzoni & P. Bianchi & L. Lambertini, 2000. "Market Structure," Working Papers 368, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    10. Tor Jakob Klette, 1994. "Estimating Price- Cost Margins and Scale Economies from a Panel of Microdata," Discussion Papers 130, Research Department of Statistics Norway.
    11. Brita Bye & Karine Nyborg, 2003. "Are Differentiated Carbon Taxes Inefficient? A General Equilibrium Analysis," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2), pages 95-112.
    12. Paul Ekins & Stefan Speck, 1999. "Competitiveness and Exemptions From Environmental Taxes in Europe," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 13(4), pages 369-396, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ssb:dispap:387. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (J Bruusgaard).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.