How Central Should the Central Bank Be?
AbstractThe nature and scope of the Federal Reserve's authority and the structure of its decision making are now "on the table" to an extent that has not been seen since 1935, and the Fed's vaunted independence is under some attack. This essay asks what the Federal Reserve should -- and shouldn't -- do, leaning heavily on the concept of economies of scope. In particular, I conclude that the central bank should monitor and regulate systemic risk because preserving financial stability is (a) closely aligned with the standard objectives of monetary policy and (b) likely to require lender of last resort powers. I also conclude that the Fed should supervise large financial institutions because that function is so closely to regulating systemic risk. However, several other functions now performed by the Fed could easily be done elsewhere. ( JEL E52, E58, G21, G28)
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Literature.
Volume (Year): 48 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Other versions of this item:
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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