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Allocation Mechanisms without Reduction

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  • David Dillenberger
  • Uzi Segal

Abstract

We study a simple variant of the house allocation problem (one-sided matching). We demonstrate that agents with recursive preferences may systematically prefer one allocation mechanism to the other, even among mechanisms that are considered to be the same in standard models, in the sense that they induce the same probability distribution over successful matchings. Using this, we propose a new priority groups mechanism and provide conditions under which it is preferred to two popular mechanisms, random top cycle and random serial dictatorship.

Suggested Citation

  • David Dillenberger & Uzi Segal, 2021. "Allocation Mechanisms without Reduction," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 455-470, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aerins:v:3:y:2021:i:4:p:455-70
    DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20200728
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Christina Letsou & Shlomo Naeh & Uzi Segal, 2022. "All probabilities are equal, but some probabilities are more equal than others," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(2), pages 423-445, September.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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