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Flip-Flopping, Primary Visibility, and the Selection of Candidates

Author

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  • Marina Agranov

Abstract

We present an incomplete information model of two-stage elections in which candidates can choose different platforms in primaries and general elections. Voters do not directly observe the chosen platforms, but infer the candidates’ ideologies from observing candidates’ campaigns. The ability of voters to detect candidates’ types depends on the visibility of the race. This model captures two patterns: the post-primary moderation effect, in which candidates pander to the party base during the primary and shift to the center in the general election; and the divisive-primary effect, which refers to the detrimental effect of hard-fought primaries on a party's general-election prospects. (JEL D11, D72, D83)

Suggested Citation

  • Marina Agranov, 2016. "Flip-Flopping, Primary Visibility, and the Selection of Candidates," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 61-85, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:8:y:2016:i:2:p:61-85
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130036
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bernard Grofman & Orestis Troumpounis & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2016. "Electoral competition with primaries and quality asymmetries," Working Papers 135286117, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    2. Enriqueta Aragonès & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2022. "Ideological Consistency and Valence," Working Papers 1383, Barcelona School of Economics.
    3. Castanheira, Micael & Huck, Steffen & Leutgeb, Johannes & Schotter, Andrew, 2023. "How Trump triumphed: Multi-candidate primaries with buffoons," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
    4. Caroline Le Pennec, 2020. "Strategic Campaign Communication: Evidence from 30,000 Candidate Manifestos," SoDa Laboratories Working Paper Series 2020-05, Monash University, SoDa Laboratories.
    5. Mats Ekman, 2022. "Advance voting and political competition," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 53-66, March.
    6. Giorgio Bellettini & Paolo Roberti, 2020. "Politicians’ coherence and government debt," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(1), pages 73-91, January.
    7. Laurent Bouton & Paola Conconi & Francisco Pino & Maurizio Zanardi, 2021. "The Tyranny of the Single-Minded: Guns, Environment, and Abortion," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 103(1), pages 48-59, March.
    8. Enriqueta Aragonès, 2023. "Simultaneous Elections," Working Papers 1425, Barcelona School of Economics.
    9. Gaetan Fournier & Alberto Grillo & Yevgeny Tsodikovich, 2023. "Strategic flip-flopping in political competition," Papers 2305.02834, arXiv.org.
    10. Cintolesi, Andrea, 2022. "Political polarization and primary elections," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 200(C), pages 596-617.
    11. Andreottola, Giovanni, 2021. "Signaling valence in primary elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 1-32.
    12. Agustin Casas, 2020. "Ideological extremism and primaries," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(3), pages 829-860, April.
    13. Giovanni Andreottola, 2020. "Signaling Valence in Primary Elections," CSEF Working Papers 559, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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