Financial Contracts and the Political Economy of Investor Protection
AbstractThis paper studies the joint dynamics of investor protection and economic development in a political economy model with capital accumulation and occupational choice. Less investor protection implies higher costs of external financing for entrepreneurs. This excludes poorer agents from entrepreneurship, increasing the profits of the remaining entrepreneurs. The main determinants of investor protection policy preferences are the agent's net worth and the expected return from entrepreneurship. When the policy is chosen by the simple majority rule, the model generates several implications consistent with the observed variation of investor protection over time and across countries. (JEL D72, E22, E32, G18, G38, J24, L26)
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics.
Volume (Year): 4 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- E22 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Capital; Investment; Capacity
- E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship
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- Financial Contracts and the Political Economy of Investor Protection (AEJ:MA 2012) in ReplicationWiki
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