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Bounded Rationality and Robust Mechanism Design: An Axiomatic Approach

Author

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  • Luyao Zhang
  • Dan Levin

Abstract

We propose an axiomatic approach to study the superior performance of mechanisms with obviously dominant strategies to those with only dominant strategies. Guided by the psychological inability to reason state-by-state, we develop Obvious Preference as a weakening of Subjective Expected Utility Theory. We show that a strategy is an obviously dominant if and only if any Obvious Preference prefer it to any deviating strategy at any reachable information set. Applying the concept of Nash Equilibrium to Obvious Preference, we propose Obvious Nash Equilibrium to identify a set of mechanisms that are more robust than mechanisms with only Nash Equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Luyao Zhang & Dan Levin, 2017. "Bounded Rationality and Robust Mechanism Design: An Axiomatic Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(5), pages 235-239, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:5:p:235-39
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171030
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ran I. Shorrer & Sandor Sovago, 2017. "Obvious Mistakes in a Strategically Simple College Admissions Environment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 17-107/V, Tinbergen Institute.
    2. Yulin Liu & Yuxuan Lu & Kartik Nayak & Fan Zhang & Luyao Zhang & Yinhong Zhao, 2022. "Empirical Analysis of EIP-1559: Transaction Fees, Waiting Time, and Consensus Security," Papers 2201.05574, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
    3. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2018. "Communication with evidence in the lab," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 139-165.
    4. André Schmelzer, 2018. "Strategy-Proofness of Stochastic Assignment Mechanisms," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 3(1), pages 17-50, December.
    5. Echenique, Federico & Miyashita, Masaki & Nakamura, Yuta & Pomatto, Luciano & Vinson, Jamie, 2022. "Twofold multiprior preferences and failures of contingent reasoning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
    6. Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2021. "A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design," ECON - Working Papers 393, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    7. Yves Breitmoser & Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch, 2022. "Obviousness around the clock," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(2), pages 483-513, April.
    8. McGee, Peter & Levin, Dan, 2019. "How obvious is the dominant strategy in an English Auction? Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 355-365.
    9. Mariya Halushka, 2021. "Obviously Strategy-proof Mechanism Design With Rich Private Information," Working Papers 2104E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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