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An excess of access: An examination of Part IIIA of the Australian Trade Practices Act

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  • Henry Ergas

Abstract

Part IIIA of the Australian Trade Practices Act defines circumstances in which a facility owner may be required to provide a third party with use of its facility. This paper examines what Part IIIA might be doing from an economic perspective and criticises ‘monopoly leveraging’ arguments for third-party access. It argues that the transactions costs of access are potentially significant, and can exceed any efficiency gains third-party access permits. These contentions are corroborated by reference to the long-running dispute between the Fortescue Metals Group and BHP Billiton Iron Ore over access to rail track in the Pilbara region of Western Australia.

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  • Henry Ergas, 2009. "An excess of access: An examination of Part IIIA of the Australian Trade Practices Act," Agenda - A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics, vol. 16(4), pages 37-66.
    • Handle: RePEc:acb:agenda:v:16:y:2009:i:4:p:37-66
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    File URL: http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p88831/pdf/031.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Henry Ergas, 2009. "Error and Design: Economics in (and some Economics of) the Australian Competition Tribunal," Agenda - A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics, vol. 16(3), pages 71-94.
    2. José A. Gómez-Ibáñez, 2016. "Open Access to Infrastructure Networks: The Experience of Railroads," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 49(2), pages 311-345, September.

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