Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/n/nep-pol/2005-10-15.html
Report NEP-POL-2005-10-15
This is the archive for NEP-POL, a report on new working papers in the area of Positive Political Economics. Eugene Beaulieu issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-POL
The following items were announced in this report:
- Bagwell,K. & Staiger,R.W., 2004, "Enforcement, private political pressure and the GATT/WTO escape clause," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 23.
- Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2005, "Why do Politicians Delegate?," Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics, number 784828000000000470, Oct.
- Item repec:eab:govern:638 is not listed on IDEAS anymore
- James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik, 2005, "A Political Economy Theory of the Soft Budget Constraint," Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, number 5605, Aug.
- Silje Aslaksen & Ragnar Torvik, 2005, "A theory of civil conflict and democracy in rentier states," Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, number 5805, May.