Report NEP-MIC-2023-05-22
This is the archive for NEP-MIC, a report on new working papers in the area of Microeconomics. Jing-Yuan Chiou issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-MIC
The following items were announced in this report:
- Sarah Auster & Nicola Pavoni, 2023, "Optimal Delegation and Information Transmission under Limited Awareness," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_256v3, Apr.
- Matteo Escud'e, 2023, "Covert learning and disclosure," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2304.02989, Apr, revised Oct 2025.
- Item repec:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2023_420 is not listed on IDEAS anymore
- Ostrovsky, Michael & Skrzypacz, Andy, 2022, "Pure-Strategy Equilibrium in the Generalized First-Price Auction," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 4043, Oct.
- Daniel M A Barreto & Alexis Ghersengorin & Victor Augias, 2022, "Price Discrimination with Redistributive Concerns," Sciences Po Economics Publications (main), HAL, number hal-04067226, Nov.
- Bimpikis, Kostas & Morgenstern, Ilan & Saban, Daniela, 2022, "Data Tracking under Competition," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 4061, Nov.
- Pinaki Mandal, 2023, "Compatibility between Stability and Strategy-Proofness: A Single-Peaked Preferences Investigation," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2304.11494, Apr, revised Jul 2025.
- Gérard Mondello, 2022, "Information Source's Reliability," GREDEG Working Papers, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France, number 2022-21, Jun, revised Oct 2022.
- V. V. Chari & Rishabh Kirpalani & Luis Perez, 2023, "On the Efficiency of Competitive Equilibria with Pandemics," Staff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, number 644, Apr, DOI: 10.21034/sr.644.
- Aviad Heifetz & Enrico Minelli & Herakles Polemarchakis, 2023, "Affective Interdependence and Welfare," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2360, Apr.
- Awad, Emiel & Minaudier, Clement, 2023, "Persuasive Lobbying and the Value of Connections," SocArXiv, Center for Open Science, number 8z4ax, Apr, DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/8z4ax.
- Victor Augias & Daniel M A Barreto, 2022, "Persuading a Wishful Thinker," Sciences Po Economics Publications (main), HAL, number hal-04066849, Feb.
- Jorge Alcalde-Unzu & Marc Vorsatz, 2023, "The structure of strategy-proof rules," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2304.12843, Apr.
- Ziwei Wang & Jiabin Wu, 2023, "Preference Evolution under Partner Choice," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2304.11504, Apr, revised Apr 2025.
- Giulio Bottazzi & Daniele Giachini & Matteo Ottaviani, 2023, "Market selection and learning under model misspecification," LEM Papers Series, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy, number 2023/18, May.
- Item repec:hal:cesptp:hal-04085258 is not listed on IDEAS anymore
- Foarta, Dana & Ting, Michael M., 2023, "Organizational Capacity and Project Dynamics," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 4069, Jan.
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