Report NEP-DES-2026-08-31

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.

Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Jerry Anunrojwong, 2026, "Robust Scale-Free Auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2608.02479, Aug, revised Aug 2026.
• Boyu Liu & Wei Tang & Zihe Wang & Shuo Zhang, 2026, "Private Private Information in Second-Price Auction," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2604.24530, Apr, revised Jul 2026.
• Sanyyam Khurana, 2026, "Auctions with outside options," Working Papers, Ashoka University, Department of Economics, number 168, Aug.
• Barkley, Aaron & Genesove, David & Hansen, James, 2024, "Haggle or Hammer? Dual-Mechanism Housing Search," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 19262, Jul.
• Charles Po-Cheng Huang, 2026, "College Admissions with Scholarship," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2608.08136, Aug, revised Sep 2026.
• Nicholas Teh, 2026, "Fair Division with Strictly Increasing Valuations: A Tight Threshold for Two-Agent EF1 and PO," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2607.23367, Jul.
• Josue Ortega & Geng Zhao & Gabriel Ziegler, 2026, "Efficiency Adjustments Break the Logarithmic Rank Barrier," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2608.09984, Aug.
• Meina Takahashi, 2026, "A Solution to the Roommate Problem," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2608.11682, Aug.
• Benkert, Jean-Michel & Schmutzler, Armin, 2024, "A Theory of Recommendations," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 19410, Aug.
• Hiroaki Odahara, 2026, "The Targeted-Loss Exposure Frontier in Auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2607.29518, Jul.
• Federico Vaccari, 2026, "Market tallies: minimal information for efficient trade," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2607.19140, Jul.
• Josue Ortega, 2026, "Asymptotic Equivalence of Immediate and Deferred Acceptance," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2607.24970, Jul, revised Aug 2026.
• Deniz Kattwinkel & Alexander Winter, 2026, "Information for nothing and authority for free," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2608.09409, Aug.
• Carnehl, Christoph & Ottaviani, Marco & Preusser, Justus, 2024, "Designing Scientific Grants," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 19235, Jul.
• Maria-Florina Balcan & Tejas Pagare & Karan Singh, 2026, "Learning to Price with Persuasion," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2608.16699, Aug.
• Thomas Daske, 2026, "The Incentive Costs of Welfare Judgments," Munich Papers in Political Economy, Munich School of Politics and Public Policy and the School of Management at the Technical University of Munich, number 51, Jun.
• Vilok Taori, 2026, "Optimal Sequential Assignment with Capacity Constrained Verification," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2608.10478, Aug.
• Terence Highsmith, 2026, "Do Preferences Matter in Balanced Task Allocation?," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2607.23222, Jul.
• Takashi Kunimoto & Cuiling Zhang, 2026, "Locally robust implementation of efficient bilateral trade with correlated beliefs," Economics and Statistics Working Papers, Singapore Management University, School of Economics, number 09-2026, Jul.
• Chandio, Rabail & Lence, Sergio & Zhang, Wendong, 2026, "Are Auction Price Premiums Real? Evidence from Farmland Sales," 2026 Annual Meeting, July 26 - 28, 2026, Kansas City, Missouri, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, number 404337, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.404337.
• Daske, Thomas, 2026, "The Incentive Costs of Welfare Judgments," EconStor Preprints, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 342974.
• Georgy Artemov & Siqi Pan, 2026, "Priority Transparency, Admission Chances, and Information Acquisition in School Choice," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2608.20698, Aug.
• Xiaohui Bei & Felix Brandt & Matthias Greger & Jannik Peters & Erel Segal-Halevi & Warut Suksompong, 2026, "Individual Fairness in Budget Aggregation," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2608.01228, Aug.
• Masaki Miyashita, 2026, "On the Sparsity of Optimal Information Structures," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2608.00729, Aug, revised Aug 2026.
• Itai Ashlagi & Joseph Root, 2026, "How to Beat FCFS," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2608.11710, Aug.

Report NEP-DES-2026-08-31

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.

Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report: