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Report NEP-DES-2026-05-25
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Dirk Bergemann & Garrett van Ryzin & Jiaxuan Li, 2026, "Supply Chain Coordination Mechanism Design: Consensus Planning Protocol Meets Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2605.16695, May.
- Andreas Kleiner & Benny Moldovanu & Philipp Strack, 2026, "Extreme Points and Majorization," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2025_749, May.
- Madjid Eshaghi Gordji & Ali Jabbari & Mohammad Ali Berahman & Esmaiel Abounoori, 2026, "Breaking Status-Quo Inertia in Living Temporal Games: Dynamic Intervention, Implementation, and Structural Design," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2605.19087, May.
- Joseph Feffer & Filip Tokarski, 2026, "Strategically Analogous Mechanisms," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2605.12802, May.
- Dongwoo Kim & Kyoo il Kim & Pallavi Pal, 2026, "Partial Identification of the Valuation Distribution in Sequential English Auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2605.14400, May.
- Jesse Rothstein & Ini Umosen & Christopher R. Walters, 2026, "School Choice and Segregation: Evidence from the Oakland Unified School District," Working Papers, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics, number 2026-38.
- Aleksei Adadurov & Sergey Barseghyan & Anton Chtepine & Antero Eloranta & Andrei Sebyakin & Arsenii Valitov, 2026, "Imperfect Commitment in Maximal Extractable Value Auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2605.22667, May, revised May 2026.
- Haris Aziz & Patrick Lederer & Jeremy Vollen, 2026, "Approximate Strategyproofness in Approval-based Budget Division," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2605.11736, May.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Christopher R. Walters, 2026, "Who Gets What in Education: Can School Matching Improve Student Achievement?," Working Papers, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics, number 2026-39.