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Report NEP-DES-2025-07-28
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Siddharth Prasad & Maria-Florina Balcan & Tuomas Sandholm, 2025, "Revenue-Optimal Efficient Mechanism Design with General Type Spaces," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2505.13687, May.
- Siddharth Prasad & Maria-Florina Balcan & Tuomas Sandholm, 2025, "Weakest Bidder Types and New Core-Selecting Combinatorial Auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2505.13680, May.
- Anand Chopra & Malachy James Gavan & Antonio Penta, 2025, "Safe Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1497, Jul.
- Leandro Arozamena & Juan-José Ganuza & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2025, "Corruption and Renegotiation in Procurement," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1492, May.
- Carlos Alós-Ferrera & Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho & Matias Nunez, 2025, "Fairness vs. Simplicity in Appointment Rules," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1490, May.