Report NEP-DES-2025-04-21
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Dirk Bergemann & Marek Bojko & Paul DŸtting & Renato Paes Leme & Haifeng Xu & Song Zuo, 2025, "Data-Driven Mechanism Design: Jointly Eliciting Preferences and Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2418R1, Mar.
- Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2025, "Screening with Persuasion," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2338R3, Mar.
- Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Nicholas Wu, 2025, "Bidding with Budgets: Algorithmic and Data-Driven Bids in Digital Advertising," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2429, Mar.
- Sanyyam Khurana, 2024, "Symmetric auctions with resale," Working Papers, Ashoka University, Department of Economics, number 128, Oct.
- Arkarup Basu Mallik & Mihir Bhattacharya, 2025, "Consistency and social choice," Working Papers, Ashoka University, Department of Economics, number 142, Mar.
- Arkarup Basu Mallik & Mihir Bhattacharya & Anuj Bhowmik, 2024, "Attributes: Less or More?," Working Papers, Ashoka University, Department of Economics, number 135, Nov.
Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/n/nep-des/2025-04-21.html