Report NEP-DES-2024-12-09
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Edith Elkind & Ayumi Igarashi & Nicholas Teh, 2024, "Fair Division of Chores with Budget Constraints," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2410.23979, Oct.
- Ryoto Ando & Kei Kimura & Taiki Todo & Makoto Yokoo, 2024, "Parameterized Voter Relevance in Facility Location Games with Tree-Shaped Invitation Graphs," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2411.05574, Nov, revised Nov 2024.
- Herings, P.J.J., 2024, "Expectational Equilibria and Drèze Equilibria in Many-to-one Matching Models," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 2818f6ae-f3b0-4b5e-9222-a.
- Xinnian Kazusa Pan, 2024, "On the Equivalence of Synchronous Coordination Game and Asynchronous Coordination Design," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2411.01879, Nov.
- L'aszl'o Csat'o & Alex Krumer, 2024, "Swiss-system chess tournaments and unfairness," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2410.19333, Oct, revised Feb 2026.
- Federico Echenique & Quitz'e Valenzuela-Stookey, 2024, "Utilitarian Social Choice and Distributional Welfare Analysis," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2411.01315, Nov.
- Guanyi Wang, 2024, "Robust Network Targeting with Multiple Nash Equilibria," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2410.20860, Oct, revised Nov 2024.
- Hofstetter, Reto & Lanz, Andreas & Sahni, Navdeep S., 2024, "Contract Design in Influencer Marketing," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 4184, Apr.
- Hans Gersbach & Kremena Valkanova, 2024, "Voting with Random Proposers: Two Rounds May Suffice," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2410.20476, Oct, revised Oct 2025.
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