Report NEP-DES-2024-11-04
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Ori Heffetz & Guy Ishai & Clayton Thomas, 2024, "Describing Deferred Acceptance and Strategyproofness to Participants: Experimental Analysis," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2409.18166, Sep.
- Carmelo RodrÃguez-Ã lvarez, 2024, "Strategy-Proof Social Choice Correspondences and Single Peaked Preferences," Documentos de Trabajo del ICAE, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico, number 2024-02.
- Michele Lombardi & Ritesh Jain & Antonio Penta, 2024, "Strategically Robust Implementation," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1461, Sep.
- Enzo Rossi, 2024, "Swiss treasury bill auctions: a review," Economic Studies, Swiss National Bank, number 2024-12.
- Marco Bornstein & Zora Che & Suhas Julapalli & Abdirisak Mohamed & Amrit Singh Bedi & Furong Huang, 2024, "Auction-Based Regulation for Artificial Intelligence," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2410.01871, Oct, revised Feb 2025.
- Stephen F. Hamilton & Benjamin Ouvrard, 2024, "Fair Pricing, Upstream Market Power, and Vertical Restraint," Working Papers, California Polytechnic State University, Department of Economics, number 2402.
- Barth, Andreas & Mansouri, Sasan & Wöbbeking, Fabian, 2024, "Information flow and market efficiency -- unintended side effects of the Plain Writing Act," VfS Annual Conference 2024 (Berlin): Upcoming Labor Market Challenges, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association, number 302384.
- Jan Knoepfle, 2024, "Dynamic Competition for Attention," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2409.18595, Sep, revised Oct 2024.
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