Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/n/nep-des/2024-10-14.html
Report NEP-DES-2024-10-14
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Wataru ISHIDA & Yusuke IWASE & Taro KUMANO, 2024, "Efficient and (or) fair allocations under market-clearing constraints," Discussion papers, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University, number e-24-004, Sep.
- Vladimir A. Karamychev, 2023, "Aftermarket Welfare and Procurement Auctions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 23-081/VII, 12.
- Liu, Tingjun & Bernhardt, Dan, 2024, "Auctioning control and cash-flow rights separately," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 1516.
- Ahmadzadeh, Amirreza, 2024, "Costly state verification with Limited Commitment," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 24-1570, Sep.
- L. Elisa Celis & Amit Kumar & Nisheeth K. Vishnoi & Andrew Xu, 2024, "Centralized Selection with Preferences in the Presence of Biases," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2409.04897, Sep.
- Jacob D. Leshno & Elaine Shi & Rafael Pass, 2024, "On the Viability of Open-Source Financial Rails: Economic Security of Permissionless Consensus," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2409.08951, Sep, revised Feb 2025.