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Report NEP-DES-2024-07-08
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Yoav Kolumbus & Joe Halpern & 'Eva Tardos, 2024, "Games with Payments between Learning Agents," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2405.20880, May, revised Feb 2026.
- Aram Grigoryan & Markus Möller, 2024, "A Theory of Auditability for Allocation Mechanisms," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 308, May.
- Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Eicke, Anselm & Hirth, Lion & Ocker, Fabian & Ott, Marion & Schlecht, Ingmar & Wang, Runxi, 2024, "Analysis of a capacity-based redispatch mechanism," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 24-025.
- Marco Bornstein & Amrit Singh Bedi & Abdirisak Mohamed & Furong Huang, 2024, "FACT or Fiction: Can Truthful Mechanisms Eliminate Federated Free Riding?," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2405.13879, May, revised Feb 2025.
- Michela Carlana & Enrico Miglino & Michela M. Tincani, 2024, "How Far Can Inclusion Go? The Long-term Impacts of Preferential College Admissions," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 32525, May.
- Antonio Estache & Renaud Foucart & Konstantinos Georgalos, 2024, "Preference for Control vs. Random Dictatorship," Working Papers ECARES, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, number 2024-10, May.