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Report NEP-DES-2024-04-29
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Item repec:cam:camjip:2304 is not listed on IDEAS anymore
- Kirill Rudov, 2024, "Fragile Stable Matchings," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2403.12183, Mar.
- Daniela Bubboloni & Michele Gori & Claudia Meo, 2024, "Resolute and symmetric mechanisms for two-sided matching problems," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2404.01404, Apr, revised Nov 2024.
- Pham, Hien, 2023, "How Information Design Shapes Optimal Selling Mechanisms," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 120462, Apr, revised 17 Mar 2024.
- Peyman Khezr & Vijay Mohan & Lionel Page, 2024, "Strategic Bidding in Knapsack Auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2403.07928, Feb, revised Apr 2024.
- Clayton Thomas, 2024, "Characterization of Priority-Neutral Matching Lattices," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2404.02142, Apr, revised Dec 2025.
- Luca Anderlini & GaOn Kim, 2024, "Tournament Auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2403.08102, Mar.
- Ian Ball & Teemu Pekkarinen, 2024, "Optimal Auction Design with Contingent Payments and Costly Verification," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2403.19945, Mar, revised Apr 2026.
- Triêu, Anh & Bos, Iwan & Schröder, Marc & Vermeulen, Dries, 2024, "Maximal matchings," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE), number 004, Apr, DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2024004.