Report NEP-DES-2023-08-14
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Seçkin Özbilen & Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2023, "Core Stability and Strategy-Proofness in Hedonic Coalition Formation Problems with Friend-Oriented Preferences," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1399, Jul.
- Maryam Bahrani & Pranav Garimidi & Tim Roughgarden, 2023, "Transaction Fee Mechanism Design with Active Block Producers," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2307.01686, Jul, revised Oct 2023.
- Simon Finster, 2023, "Selling Multiple Complements with Packaging Costs," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2306.14247, Jun, revised Jul 2025.
- Domenico Moramarco & Umutcan Salman, 2023, "Equal opportunities in many-to-one matching markets," Working Papers, ECINEQ, Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, number 649, Jul.
- Anja Prummer & Francesco Nava, 2023, "Value Design in Optimal Mechanisms," Economics working papers, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria, number 2023-05, Jul.
- Saurabh Amin & Patrick Jaillet & Haripriya Pulyassary & Manxi Wu, 2023, "Market Design for Capacity Sharing in Networks," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2307.03994, Jul, revised Nov 2025.
- Item repec:hal:pseptp:hal-04157650 is not listed on IDEAS anymore
Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/n/nep-des/2023-08-14.html