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Report NEP-DES-2023-07-17
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Vitali Gretschko & Helene Mass, 2023, "Worst-Case Equilibria in First-Price Auctions," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_434, Jun.
- Jason Shachat & Lijia Wei, 2023, "Discrete Rule Learning in First Price Auctions," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, number 23-07.
- Pranjal Rawat, 2023, "Designing Auctions when Algorithms Learn to Bid," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2306.09437, Jun, revised Mar 2026.
- Yurong Chen & Qian Wang & Zhijian Duan & Haoran Sun & Zhaohua Chen & Xiang Yan & Xiaotie Deng, 2023, "Coordinated Dynamic Bidding in Repeated Second-Price Auctions with Budgets," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2306.07709, Jun.
- Bo Young Chang, 2023, "Estimating the Slope of the Demand Function at Auctions for Government of Canada Bonds," Discussion Papers, Bank of Canada, number 2023-12, Jun, DOI: 10.34989/sdp-2023-12.
- Labrini Zarpala, 2023, "Auctioning Corporate Bonds: A Uniform-Price under Investment Mandates," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2306.07134, Jun.
- Noelia Juarez & Paola B. Manasero & Jorge Oviedo, 2023, "Nash implementation in a many-to-one matching market," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2305.13956, May, revised Apr 2024.
- Eric Kamwa, 2023, "On Two Voting systems that combine approval and preferences: Fallback Voting and Preference Approval Voting," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03614585, Jun.
- Will Sandholtz & Andrew Tai, 2023, "House-Swapping with Objective Indifferences," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2306.09529, Jun.
- Denizalp Goktas & Jiayi Zhao & Amy Greenwald, 2023, "T\^atonnement in Homothetic Fisher Markets," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2306.04890, Jun, revised Feb 2025.