Report NEP-DES-2023-07-10
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Ahmadzadeh, Amirreza & Kamali-Shahdadi, Behrang, 2023, "Matching Unskilled/Skilled Workers to Firms Facing Budget Constraints," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 23-1446, Jun.
- Yi-You Yang, 2023, "Decentralized Re-equilibration and Comparative Statics in Matching Markets with Contracts," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2305.17948, May, revised Apr 2026.
- Dietzenbacher, Bas & Tamura, Yuki, 2023, "Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE), number 009, Jun, DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2023009.
- Akaki Mamageishvili & Mahimna Kelkar & Jan Christoph Schlegel & Edward W. Felten, 2023, "Buying Time: Latency Racing vs. Bidding in Transaction Ordering," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2306.02179, Jun, revised Aug 2023.
- Amel Awadelkarim & Arjun Seshadri & Itai Ashlagi & Irene Lo & Johan Ugander, 2023, "Rank-heterogeneous Preference Models for School Choice," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2306.01801, Jun.
- Ahmad Awde & Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Julien Yves Rolland & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2023, "Social unacceptability for simple voting procedures," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03614587, May, DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_3.
- Qianjun Lyu & Wing Suen & Yimeng Zhang, 2023, "Coarse Information Design," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2305.18020, May, revised Jun 2025.
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