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Report NEP-DES-2023-04-24
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Kazuya Kikuchi & Yukio Koriyama, 2023, "A General Impossibility Theorem on Pareto Efficiency and Bayesian Incentive Compatibility," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2303.05968, Mar, revised Mar 2024.
- Seungjin Han & Alex Sam & Youngki Shin, 2023, "Optimal Delegation in Markets for Matching with Signaling," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2303.09415, Mar.
- Siyu Chen & Jibang Wu & Yifan Wu & Zhuoran Yang, 2023, "Learning to Incentivize Information Acquisition: Proper Scoring Rules Meet Principal-Agent Model," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2303.08613, Mar, revised Aug 2023.
- Steven J. Brams & Mehmet S. Ismail & D. Marc Kilgour, 2023, "Fairer Shootouts in Soccer: The $m-n$ Rule," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2303.04807, Feb.