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Report NEP-DES-2022-09-19
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Rangeet Bhattacharyya & Parvik Dave & Palash Dey & Swaprava Nath, 2022, "Optimal Referral Auction Design," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2208.09326, Aug, revised Jul 2023.
- Anindya Bhattacharya & Debapriya Sen, 2022, "On mechanism design with expressive preferences: an aspect of the social choice of Brexit," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2208.09851, Aug.
- Wesley H. Holliday & Chase Norman & Eric Pacuit & Saam Zahedian, 2022, "Impossibility theorems involving weakenings of expansion consistency and resoluteness in voting," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2208.06907, Aug, revised Mar 2023.
- Francesco Giovannoni & Toomas Hinnosaar, 2022, "Pricing Novel Goods," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2208.04985, Aug, revised Aug 2024.