Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/n/nep-des/2022-08-29.html
Report NEP-DES-2022-08-29
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Peter Troyan, 2022, "Non-Obvious Manipulability of the Rank-Minimizing Mechanism," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2206.11359, Jun, revised Jun 2024.
- Zaifu Yang & Jingsheng Yu, 2022, "An Efficient and Strategy-Proof Multi-Item Ascending Auction under Financial Constraints," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York, number 22/02, May.
- Philippe Jehiel & Konrad Mierendorff, 2022, "Auction Design with Data-Driven Misspecifications," Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-03735747, Jul.
- Xu Lang & Debasis Mishra, 2022, "Symmetric reduced form voting," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2207.09253, Jul, revised Apr 2023.
- Morimitsu Kurino & Tetsutaro Hatakeyama, 2022, "Inter-attribute equity in assignment problems: Leveling the playing field by priority design," Keio-IES Discussion Paper Series, Institute for Economics Studies, Keio University, number 2022-009, Jun.