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Report NEP-DES-2022-08-08
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Ayumi Igarashi & Yasushi Kawase & Warut Suksompong & Hanna Sumita, 2022, "Fair Division with Two-Sided Preferences," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2206.05879, Jun, revised Aug 2024.
- Gong, Doudou & Dietzenbacher, Bas & Peters, Hans, 2022, "Mechanisms for division problems with single-dipped preferences," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE), number 007, Jul, DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2022007.
- Andreas Bjerre-Nielsen & Emil Chrisander, 2022, "Voluntary Information Disclosure in Centralized Matching: Efficiency Gains and Strategic Properties," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2206.15096, Jun.
- Laurence Jacquet & Etienne Lehmann, 2021, "Optimal tax problems with multidimensional heterogeneity: A mechanism design approach," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03681456, Jul, DOI: 10.1007/s00355-021-01349-4.
- Joshua S. Gans & Richard T. Holden, 2022, "Mechanism Design Approaches to Blockchain Consensus," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 30189, Jun.
- Xiaoming Cai & Pieter Gautier & Ronald Wolthoff, 2022, "Meetings and Mechanisms," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-727, Jul.
- Haris Aziz & Sujit Gujar & Manisha Padala & Mashbat Suzuki & Jeremy Vollen, 2022, "Coordinating Monetary Contributions in Participatory Budgeting," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2206.05966, Jun, revised Feb 2023.
- Alexei Parakhonyak & Anton Sobolev, 2022, "Persuasion Without Priors," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2022_359, Jul.