Report NEP-DES-2022-05-16
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Pinaki Mandal, 2022, "Simple dominance of fixed priority top trading cycles," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2204.02154, Apr, revised Feb 2023.
- Agust'in G. Bonifacio & Noelia Juarez & Pablo Neme & Jorge Oviedo, 2022, "Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2203.16293, Mar.
- Suguru Otani, 2022, "Individual Rationality Conditions of Identifying Matching Costs in Transferable Utility Matching Games," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2204.00713, Apr, revised May 2024.
- Mehdi Ayouni & Franck Bien & Thomas Lanzi, 2022, "The failure of the delegation principle in a principal-agent model with transfers," Working Papers of BETA, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg, number 2022-14.
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