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Report NEP-DES-2022-04-04
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Tsuyoshi Adachi & Yuki Ishibashi, 2022, "Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with interval constraints," Working Papers, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics, number 2124, Mar.
- P'eter Bir'o & Gergely Cs'aji, 2022, "Strong core and Pareto-optimal solutions for the multiple partners matching problem under lexicographic preferences," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2202.05484, Feb.
- Soumendu Sarkar, 2022, "Strategyproof and Budget Balanced Mechanisms for Assembly," Working papers, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, number 320, Feb.
- Debasis Mishra & Kolagani Paramahamsa, 2022, "Selling to a principal and a budget-constrained agent," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2202.10378, Feb, revised Oct 2024.
- Lirong Xia, 2022, "The Impact of a Coalition: Assessing the Likelihood of Voter Influence in Large Elections," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2202.06411, Feb, revised Jun 2023.
- Rodrigo Carril & Andres Gonzalez-Lira & Michael S. Walker, 2022, "Competition under incomplete contracts and the design of procurement policies," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 1824, Mar.
- Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Andersson, Tommy, 2022, "School Choice," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics, number 2022:4, Feb.