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Report NEP-DES-2021-10-25
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Sosung Baik & Sung-Ha Hwang, 2021, "Auction design with ambiguity: Optimality of the first-price and all-pay auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2110.08563, Oct.
- Cherbonnier, Frédéric & Salant, David & Van Der Straeten, Karine, 2021, "Getting auctions for transportation capacity to roll," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 21-1254, Oct.
- Fritz Helmedag, 2021, "Basic Bidding Formats: Characteristics and Differences," Chemnitz Economic Papers, Department of Economics, Chemnitz University of Technology, number 051, Oct, revised Oct 2021.
- Naonori Kakimura & Donghao Zhu, 2021, "Dynamic Bipartite Matching Market with Arrivals and Departures," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2110.10824, Oct.
- Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Philippe Solal, 2021, "A Core-partition solution for coalitional rankings with a variable population domain," Working Papers, CRESE, number 2021-06, Oct.
- Semyon Malamud & Andreas Schrimpf, 2021, "Persuasion by Dimension Reduction," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2110.08884, Oct, revised Oct 2022.