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Report NEP-DES-2021-10-11
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Xiang Han & Onur Kesten & M. Utku Ünver, 2021, "Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: A Theory of Multi-unit Exchange with Compatibility-based Preferences," Boston College Working Papers in Economics, Boston College Department of Economics, number 1038, Jun.
- Xingwei Hu, 2021, "Feature Selection by a Mechanism Design," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2110.02419, Oct.
- Srhoj, Stjepan & Dragojević, Melko, 2021, "Public procurement and supplier job creation: Insights from auctions," GLO Discussion Paper Series, Global Labor Organization (GLO), number 946.
- Lucas Bottcher & Georgia Kernell, 2021, "Tradeoffs in Hierarchical Voting Systems," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2110.02298, Oct.
- Hoon Oh & Yanhan Tang & Zong Zhang & Alexandre Jacquillat & Fei Fang, 2021, "Efficiency, Fairness, and Stability in Non-Commercial Peer-to-Peer Ridesharing," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2110.01152, Oct, revised Jun 2023.
- Dylan Laplace Mermoud & Michel Grabisch & Peter Sudhölter, 2021, "Algorithmic aspects of core nonemptiness and core stability," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, number 21028, Jul.
- Elena L. Del Mercato & Van Quy Nguyen, 2021, "Sufficient conditions for a "simple" Second Welfare Theorem with other-regarding preferences," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, number 21029, Jul.