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Report NEP-DES-2021-09-27
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Julien Combe & Vladyslav Nora & Olivier Tercieux, 2021, "Dynamic assignment without money: Optimality of spot mechanisms," Working Papers, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics, number 2021-11, Jul.
- Hugo Gimbert & Claire Mathieu & Simon Mauras, 2021, "Constrained School Choice with Incomplete Information," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2109.09089, Sep.
- Ata Atay & Eric Bahel & Tam'as Solymosi, 2021, "Matching markets with middlemen under transferable utility," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2109.05456, Sep, revised Jan 2022.
- Jibang Wu & Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru & Haifeng Xu, 2021, "Auctioning with Strategically Reticent Bidders," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2109.04888, Sep, revised Jan 2023.
- Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris & Constantine Sorokin & Eyal Winter, 2021, "Selling Impressions: Efficiency vs. Competition," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2300, Aug.
- Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Zhou, Yu, 2021, "Equilibria in Matching Markets with Soft and Hard Liquidity Constraints," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE), number 013, Sep, DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2021013.
- Masayuki Odora, 2021, "Potentials and Solutions of Cooperative Games," Working Papers, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics, number 2115, Sep.