Report NEP-DES-2021-03-08
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Elizabeth Baldwin & Martin Bichler & Maximilian Fichtl & Paul Klemperer, 2021, "Strong Substitutes: Structural Properties, and a New Algorithm for Competitive Equilibrium Prices," Economics Papers, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, number 2021-W02, Feb.
- Karmeliuk, Maria & Kocher, Martin, 2021, "Teams and Individuals in Standard Auction Formats: Decisions and Emotions," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 279, Feb.
- Yu Zhou & Youngsub Chun & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2021, "A characterization of the Vickery rule in slot allocation problems," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1120, Mar.
- Ana Viana & Xenia Klimentova & Péter Biró & Flip Klijn, 2021, "Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets: Respecting Improvement, Integer Programming, and Kidney Exchange," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1235, Feb.
- David Dillenberger & Uzi Segal, 2021, "Allocation Mechanisms Without Reduction," Boston College Working Papers in Economics, Boston College Department of Economics, number 1027, Feb.
- Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Kübler, Dorothea & Pan, Siqi, 2021, "Costly Information Acquisition in Centralized Matching Markets," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 280, Feb.
- Item repec:lau:crdeep:21.03 is not listed on IDEAS anymore
- Laurence Jacquet & Etienne Lehmann, 2021, "Optimal Tax Problems with Multidimensional Heterogeneity: A Mechanism Design Approach," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 8871.
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