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Report NEP-DES-2021-02-15
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Ostrovsky, Michael, 2020, "Choice Screen Auctions," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 3912, Nov.
- Pablo Guillen & Róbert F. Veszteg, 2019, "Strategy-proofness in experimental matching markets," Working Papers, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics, number 1913, Aug.
- Bary S R Pradelski & Heinrich H Nax, 2020, "Market sentiments and convergence dynamics in decentralized assignment economies," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03100116, Mar, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-019-00694-0.
- Marina Agranov & Ahrash Dianat & Larry Samuelson & Leeat Yariv, 2021, "Paying to Match: Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 8820.
- Frédéric Koessler & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022, "Informed Information Design," Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-03107866, Nov.