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Report NEP-DES-2020-11-09
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Ryosuke Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2020, "Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasilinear preferences:," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1107, Oct.
- Yi-Chun Chen & Xiangqian Yang, 2020, "Information Design in Optimal Auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2010.08990, Oct, revised Oct 2022.
- Robert Clark & Decio Coviello & Adriano De Leverano, 2020, "Complementary bidding and the collusive arrangement: Evidence from an antitrust investigation," Working Paper, Economics Department, Queen's University, number 1446, Jul.
- Jens Gudmundsson & Jens Leth Hougaard & Trine Tornøe Platz, 2020, "Decentralized Task Coordination," IFRO Working Paper, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics, number 2020/11, Oct.
- P'eter Bir'o & Avinatan Hassidim & Assaf Romm & Ran I. Shorrer & S'andor S'ov'ag'o, 2020, "The Large Core of College Admission Markets: Theory and Evidence," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2010.08631, Oct, revised Aug 2022.
- Xiaotie Deng & Ron Lavi & Tao Lin & Qi Qi & Wenwei Wang & Xiang Yan, 2020, "A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Empirical Revenue Maximization Algorithm with Endogenous Sampling," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2010.05519, Oct.
- Kai Hao Yang, 2020, "Selling Consumer Data for Profit: Optimal Market-Segmentation Design and its Consequences," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2258, Oct.
- Mario Vazquez Corte, 2020, "A Model of Choice with Minimal Compromise," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2010.08771, Oct, revised Oct 2020.