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Report NEP-DES-2020-10-26
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Nobel Prize Committee, 2020, "The quest for the perfect auction," Nobel Prize in Economics documents, Nobel Prize Committee, number 2020-1, Oct.
- Nobel Prize Committee, 2020, "Improvements to auction theory and inventions of new auction formats," Nobel Prize in Economics documents, Nobel Prize Committee, number 2020-2, Oct.
- Sushil Bikhchandani & Debasis Mishra, 2020, "Selling Two Identical Objects," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2009.11545, Sep, revised Aug 2021.
- Joffrey Derchu & Philippe Guillot & Thibaut Mastrolia & Mathieu Rosenbaum, 2020, "AHEAD : Ad-Hoc Electronic Auction Design," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2010.02827, Oct.
- Hungria Gunnelin, Rosane, 2020, "Bidding strategies and winner’s curse in auctions of non-distressed residential real estate," Working Paper Series, Royal Institute of Technology, Department of Real Estate and Construction Management & Banking and Finance, number 20/13, Oct.
- Jugal Garg & Thorben Trobst & Vijay V. Vazirani, 2020, "One-Sided Matching Markets with Endowments: Equilibria and Algorithms," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2009.10320, Sep, revised Jul 2021.
- Item repec:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2020_214 is not listed on IDEAS anymore
- Agustin G. Bonifacio & Elena Inarra & Pablo Neme, 2020, "A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2009.11689, Sep, revised May 2024.
- Vijay V. Vazirani, 2020, "An Extension of the Birkhoff-von Neumann Theorem to Non-Bipartite Graphs," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2010.05984, Oct, revised Oct 2020.