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Report NEP-DES-2020-07-27
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Joseph Root & David S. Ahn, 2020, "Incentives and Efficiency in Constrained Allocation Mechanisms," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2006.06776, Jun, revised Nov 2025.
- Sanyyam Khurana, 2020, "Unraveling of Value-Rankings in Auctions with Resale," Working papers, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, number 308, Jun.
- Katerina Sherstyuk & Krit Phankitnirundorn & Michael J. Roberts, 2020, "Randomized Double Auctions: Gains from Trade, Trader Roles, and Price Discovery," Working Papers, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics, number 202018, Jul.
- Fafchamps, Marcel & Abebe, Girum & Koelle, Michael & Quinn, Simon, 2020, "Learning Management Through Matching: A Field Experiment Using Mechanism Design," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 14284, Jan.
- Nicolas Quérou & David Pérez-Castrillo & Inés Macho-Stadler, 2020, "Goal-Oriented Agents in a Market," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1190, Jul.
- Herings, P. Jean-Jacques, 2020, "Expectational Equilibria in Many-to-one Matching Models with Contracts - A Reformulation of Competitive Equilibrium," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE), number 018, Jul, DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2020018.
- Sumit Goel & Wade Hann-Caruthers, 2020, "Project selection with partially verifiable information," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2007.00907, Jul, revised Feb 2022.
- Elliot Lipnowski & Laurent Mathevet & Dong Wei, 2020, "Optimal Attention Management: A Tractable Framework," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2006.07729, Jun, revised Mar 2022.