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Report NEP-DES-2020-05-25
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Jingsheng Yu & Jun Zhang, 2020, "Efficient and fair trading mechanisms for resource exchange in market design," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2005.06878, May, revised Aug 2025.
- Scott Duke Kominers & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2020, "Paying It Backward and Forward: Expanding Access to Convalescent Plasma Therapy Through Market Design," Boston College Working Papers in Economics, Boston College Department of Economics, number 1007, May.
- Jerry Anunrojwong & Krishnamurthy Iyer & Vahideh Manshadi, 2020, "Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2005.07253, May, revised Oct 2022.
- Anne Carlstein, 2020, "Exploring Weak Strategy-Proofness in Voting Theory," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2005.07521, May.
- Guy Avni & Ismael Jecker & {DJ}or{dj}e v{Z}ikeli'c, 2020, "Infinite-Duration All-Pay Bidding Games," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2005.06636, May, revised Dec 2020.
- Juan Beccuti, 2020, "On the Optimality of Price-posting in Rental Markets," Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft, number dp2007, Mar.
- Assimakis Kattis & Fabian Trottner, 2020, "Stabilizing Congestion in Decentralized Record-Keepers," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2005.06093, May.
- Gabrielle Demange, 2019, "Mechanisms in a digitalized world," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number hal-01715951.