Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/n/nep-des/2020-03-23.html
Report NEP-DES-2020-03-23
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Olivier Armantier, 2013, "A “Reference Price Auction” to Buy or Sell Different Assets Simultaneously," Liberty Street Economics, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, number 20130102, Jan.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020, "Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement," CARF F-Series, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, number CARF-F-474, Mar.
- Yan Chen & Peter Cramton & John List & Axel Ockenfels, 2020, "Market Design, Human Behavior and Management," Artefactual Field Experiments, The Field Experiments Website, number 00685.
- Hirata, Daisuke & 平田, 大祐 & Kasuya, Yusuke & 糟谷, 祐介 & Tomoeda, Kentaro & 友枝, 健太郎, 2020, "Stability against Robust Deviations in the Roommate Problem," Discussion Papers, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, number 2020-02, Mar.
- Karl Schlag & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2020, "Compromise, Don't Optimize: Generalizing Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium to Allow for Ambiguity," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2003.02539, Mar, revised Sep 2021.