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Report NEP-DES-2020-01-20
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2017, "Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1001r, May, revised Jan 2020.
- Jingfeng Lu & Zongwei Lu & Christian Riis, 2019, "Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request," Papers, arXiv.org, number 1912.03607, Dec, revised May 2021.
- Teemu Pennanen, 2020, "Efficient allocations in double auction markets," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2001.02071, Jan, revised Jan 2021.
- Mumcu, Ayse & Saglam, Ismail, 2019, "Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 97698, Dec.
- Simon P. Anderson & Martin Peitz, 2019, "Media See-Saws: Winners and Losers in Platform Markets," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2019_089v2, Dec.