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Report NEP-DES-2019-09-23
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Federico Echenique & Antonio Miralles & Jun Zhang, 2019, "Constrained Pseudo-market Equilibrium," Papers, arXiv.org, number 1909.05986, Sep, revised Nov 2020.
- Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2019, "Monotonic Norms and Orthogonal Issues in Multidimensional Voting," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-644, Sep.
- Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2019, "Information, Market Power and Price Volatility," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2200, Sep.
- Choo, Lawrence & Kaplan, Todd R. & Zhou, Xiaoyu, 2019, "Can auctions select people by their level-k types?," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 95987, Sep.
- Berliant, Marcus & Thakur, Sounak, 2019, "Commitment and matching in the marriage market," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 96001, Sep.
- Trudeau, Christian & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2018, "Clique games: a family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 95999, Oct.
- Mihir Bhattacharya & Nicolas Gravel, 2019, "Is the preference of the majority representative?," AMSE Working Papers, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, number 1921, Sep.