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Report NEP-DES-2019-09-02
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Daniel Lehmann, 2019, "Revealed Preferences for Matching with Contracts," Papers, arXiv.org, number 1908.08823, Aug, revised Mar 2020.
- Josue Ortega & Erel Segal-Halevi, 2019, "Obvious Manipulations in Cake-Cutting," Papers, arXiv.org, number 1908.02988, Aug, revised Oct 2019.
- Rene van den Brink & Dinko Dimitrov & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2019, "Winning Coalitions in Plurality Voting Democracies," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 19-062/II, Aug.
- Gautier, Pieter & Albrecht, James & Cai, Xiaoming & Vroman, Susan, 2019, "Multiple Applications, Competing Mechanisms, and Market Power," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 13912, Aug.
- Costa, Carlos Eugênio da & Lima, Lucas Alves Estevam de, 2019, "Mechanism design and the collective approach to household behavior," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE), EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), number 808, Aug.
- Jason Allen & Robert Clark & Brent Hickman & Eric Richert, 2019, "Resolving Failed Banks: Uncertainty, Multiple Bidding & Auction Design," Staff Working Papers, Bank of Canada, number 19-30, Aug, DOI: 10.34989/swp-2019-30.
- Caio Waisman & Harikesh S. Nair & Carlos Carrion, 2019, "Online Causal Inference for Advertising in Real-Time Bidding Auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 1908.08600, Aug, revised Feb 2024.