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Report NEP-DES-2019-02-18
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Giovanni Compiani & Phil Haile & Marcelo Sant'Anna, 2018, "Common values, unobserved heterogeneity, and endogenous entry in U.S. offshore oil lease auctions," CeMMAP working papers, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies, number CWP37/18, Jul.
- Nicholas Ryan, 2019, "Contract Enforcement and Productive Efficiency: Evidence from the Bidding and Renegotiation of Power Contracts in India," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2164, Feb.
- Serafin J. Grundl & Yu Zhu, 2019, "Robust Inference in First-Price Auctions : Experimental Findings as Identifying Restrictions," Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), number 2019-006, Feb, DOI: 10.17016/FEDS.2019.006.
- Teresa Estañ & Natividad Llorca & Ricardo Martínez & Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano, 2019, "On how to allocate the fixed cost of transport networks," ThE Papers, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada., number 19/03, Feb.