Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/n/nep-des/2018-09-17.html
Report NEP-DES-2018-09-17
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Andersson, Tommy & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2018, "Strategy-Proof Allocation of Objects: A Characterization Result," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics, number 2018:21, Sep, revised 10 May 2023.
- Chi, Chang Koo, 2018, "An analysis of the two-bidder all-pay auction with common values," Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics, number 17/2018, Aug.
- Bobkova, Nina, 2017, "Asymmetric Budget Constraints in a First Price Auction," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 88628, Feb, revised Aug 2018.
- Manzano, Carolina & Vives, Xavier, 2017, "Market Power and Welfare in Asymmetric Divisible Good Auctions," IESE Research Papers, IESE Business School, number D/1162, Jan.
- Zaifu Yang & Jingsheng Yu, 2018, "Efficient Ascending Menu Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York, number 18/09, Sep.
- Paul Pezanis-Christou & Hang Wu, 2018, "A non-game-theoretic approach to bidding in first-price and all-pay auctions," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy, number 2018-12, Aug.
- Dolgopolova, Irina & Teuber, Ramona & Roosen, Jutta, , "The Reference Price Is Not The Limit: Analysis Of Consumer Valuations In Second-price Vickrey Auction," 2017 International Congress, August 28-September 1, 2017, Parma, Italy, European Association of Agricultural Economists, number 260882, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.260882.
- Hammond, Peter J, 2018, "Allocation Mechanisms, Incentives, and Endemic Institutional Externalities," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA, number 42.
- DEHEZ Pierre, & GINSBURGH Victor,, 2018, "Approval voting and Shapley ranking," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 2018012, Apr.
- Duffie, Darrell & Antill, Samuel, 2018, "Augmenting Markets with Mechanisms," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 3623, May.