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Report NEP-DES-2018-02-26
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Alex Rees-Jones & Samuel Skowronek, 2018, "An Experimental Investigation of Preference Misrepresentation in the Residency Match," Papers, arXiv.org, number 1802.01990, Feb, revised Aug 2018.
- John Wooders & Matt Van Essen, 2018, "Dual Auctions for Assigning Winners and Compensating Losers," Working Papers, New York University Abu Dhabi, Department of Social Science, number 20180013, Jan, revised Jan 2018.
- Richard van Weelden, 2018, "Excluding Compromise: Negotiating Only With Polarized Interests," Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, number 6329, Jan.
- Damien Challet & Nikita Gourianov, 2018, "Dynamical regularities of US equities opening and closing auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 1802.01921, Feb, revised Oct 2018.
- Gersbach, Hans & Wickramage, Kamali, 2018, "Balanced Voting," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 12672, Feb.