Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/n/nep-cta/2014-07-28.html
Report NEP-CTA-2014-07-28
This is the archive for NEP-CTA, a report on new working papers in the area of Contract Theory and Applications. Guillem Roig issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-CTA
The following items were announced in this report:
- Item repec:qmw:qmwecw:wp721 is not listed on IDEAS anymore
- Michael P. Keane & Olean Stavrunova, 2014, "Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and the Demand for Medigap Insurance," Economics Papers, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, number 2014-W02, Jul.
- Sylvain Chassang & Gerard Padró i Miquel, 2014, "Corruption, Intimidation, and Whistle-blowing: a Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 20315, Jul.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Ishii, Yuhta & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2014, "Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags," Scholarly Articles, Harvard University Department of Economics, number 11880354.
- Jellal, Mohamed, 2014, "Diaspora famille transferts et contrat implicite
[Diaspora famille and transfers as implicit cintract]," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 57387, Jul. - Tomoya Nakamura, 2014, "One-Leader and Multiple-Follower Stackelberg Games with Private Information," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 0908, Jul.
- Philipp Meyer-Brauns, 2014, "Financial Contracting with Tax Evaders," Working Papers, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, number tax-mpg-rps-2014-01, Jan.
- Todd Keister, 2014, "Bailouts and Financial Fragility," Departmental Working Papers, Rutgers University, Department of Economics, number 201401, Jan.
- Thomas Ahn & Jacob L. Vigdor, 2014, "When Incentives Matter Too Much: Explaining Significant Responses to Irrelevant Information," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 20321, Jul.
- Kotowski, Maciej Henryk & Weisbach, David A. & Zeckhauser, Richard Jay, 2014, "Audits as Signals," Scholarly Articles, Harvard Kennedy School of Government, number 12176676.
- Liyan Yang & Itay Goldstein, 2014, "Good Disclosure, Bad Disclosure," 2014 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics, number 42.
- Item repec:imf:imfwpa:14/116 is not listed on IDEAS anymore
- Item repec:dnb:dnbwpp:430 is not listed on IDEAS anymore
- Li, Fei & Kotowski, Maciej Henryk, 2014, "On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints," Scholarly Articles, Harvard Kennedy School of Government, number 11718166.
- Kotowski, Maciej Henryk & Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2013, "Bribing in First-Price Auctions: Corrigendum," Scholarly Articles, Harvard Kennedy School of Government, number 10591649.
- Jellal, Mohamed, 2014, "Diaspora transferts et signal de richesse
[Diaspora remittances and signaling wealth game]," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 57356, Jul. - Item repec:ipg:wpaper:2014-417 is not listed on IDEAS anymore