Report NEP-CDM-2026-04-20
This is the archive for NEP-CDM, a report on new working papers in the area of Collective Decision-Making. Marco Novarese issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-CDM
The following items were announced in this report:
- Antoinette Baujard & Roberto Brunetti & Isabelle Lebon & Simone Marsilio, 2024, "How People Understand Voting Rules," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-04653702, Jul.
- Ryo Arawatari & Tetsuo Ono, 2026, "Optimal Supermajority Threshold for Suspending Fiscal Rules," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics, number 26-05, Apr.
- Shuhei Kitamura & Ryo Takahashi & Katsunori Yamada, 2025, "Misperceived Social Norms and Political Accountability: Evidence and Theory," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1289rr, Jun, revised Apr 2026.
- Nicola Fontana & Tommaso Nannicini & James M. Snyder, Jr., 2026, "Goodbye, Montesquieu: Executive Spillovers in Judicial Elections," Trinity Economics Papers, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics, number tep0626, Mar.
Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/n/nep-cdm/2026-04-20.html